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ESSAY
LIFE, LIBERTY & WHOSE PROPERTY?: AN ESSAY ON
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Honorable Loren A Smith*
This essay explores the place that the concept of property
rights occupies in our constitutional system. The word "proper-
ty" has been used in a number of ways in the history of our
Republic. I use it here in the way James Madison did:
PROPERTY
This term in its particular application means "that
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in exclusion of every other
individual."
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing
to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and
which leaves to every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or
money is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions
and the free communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opin-
ions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them.
He has property very dear to him in the safety and liber-
ty of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims. I want to thank T. Ken-
neth Cribb, Jr., and Lawrence J. Block for taking the time to read and comment on
this essay.
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In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his prop-
erty, he may be equally said to have a property in his
rights.
Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is
duly respected. No man is safe in his opinions, his person,
his faculties or his possessions.
Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the
same, tho' from an opposite cause.'
While the word "property" does not appear in the Preamble
of the Constitution, the Federalist Papers make it very clear
that each objective enumerated in the Preamble involved, in
part, the protection of the citizen's property rights.2 In fact,
using the Madisonian conception that property includes all of
the fundamental aspects of the integrity of the human person,
life, liberty and property, the whole preamble is about protect-
ing the citizen's rights in property and property in rights.
My thesis here is three-fold. The first premise is that the
type of free society envisioned by the Framers requires the
jealous protection of property, correctly understood. The second
prong is that no principled distinction can be made between
what we today loosely refer to as political, religious, artistic, or
personal liberty, and property rights or economic liberty. The
third aspect is that we have as a society and legal system, at
least since the progressive era, tended to be insensitive to prop-
erty rights or economic liberty.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS & THE FREE SOCIETY
My initial point is that a free society cannot exist without
the strong protection of individual property rights and the
mechanism for their jealous protection. At a time when we pay
lip service to the concepts of a "free society," "market economy,"
and a "free enterprise system" this first point may sound like a
truism in little need of intellectual defense. For two reasons I
think this is not so.
1. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792) reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, at 101 (Gallard Hunt ed., 1906).
2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 84, 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
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The Nightmare
First, the world has been through a nightmare that has not
yet evaporated into the morning sunshine. For over seventy
years the other "superpower" on this planet subscribed to an
ideology in which the core belief was a rejection of the concept
of private property. Not only was Soviet ideology at its core
opposed to private property and liberty, but the Soviet regime
and other socialist states attempted to rigorously embody that
core belief in the structure of their societies. Statutes, courts,
and monetary and regulatory systems were developed with the
vision and underlying rule that property rights, in virtually all
their Western manifestations, did not exist.
The aftereffects of this belief, or "nightmare," will be with us
for decades to come. While the wounds are healing rapidly in
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, the Russian patient
will not fully recover for years, and relapses have already oc-
curred in parts of the old empire. The fifth of the world's popu-
lation that lives in China is only getting a partial dose of prop-
erty and liberty, and only in certain distinct areas. Thus, the
question of whether a free society can exist without property
rights of the kind and level protected by our constitutional
system is a real and significant issue in the world.
The question of whether a free society can exist without
property rights is also, I would contend, a real and significant
intellectual issue in the America of 1996. This is not because
any major group, social or political, has urged the abolition or
severe limitation of property rights. The reason the issue is of
current relevance to law and society is, ironically, because prop-
erty rights have not been a cutting edge issue for a while.
Their underlying theory therefore, has fallen into disuse, and
perhaps has even atrophied. We have little appreciation for
what property rights mean to practical legal or legislative poli-
cy. We rarely focus on the reason for such rights in general,
and the logic that may follow from accepting those premises.
We often create statutory and legal policies that conflict with
each other because of a confused set of underlying premises
about property rights.
To further this theme, we are living at the end of an intellec-
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tual era that has been rather hostile to individual property and
liberty. The twentieth century has been enamored with the
power, rationality, and efficacy of the State and central plan-
ning. Much of this positive feeling came from the dramatic
strides made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries by science and industry in remaking the physical world.
The power of the rational mind to tame, and even restructure,
nature, through rational human invention, held several genera-
tions in admiring awe. The railroad, telegraph, electric light,
and machine made time and space itself manipulable in ways
formerly only dreamed of by magicians.
Why not manipulate human beings and society with all their
foibles and defects? This was the time during which social sci-
ence emerged as a practical concept, and Dean Langdell was
attempting to bring the organizing logic of the sciences to bear
upon the common law. Slightly later, as a corollary to the con-
cept of the social scientist there emerged the concept of the
social engineer. The social engineer would create an ever more
perfect society, based on social science, just as mechanical,
chemical, and electrical engineers were creating ever more effi-
cient and rational factory, production, and transportation sys-
tems. As the chemical engineers used new discoveries in chem-
istry to design new chemical plants and processes, the social
engineers would use the new "sciences" of sociology and psy-
chology to restructure society. Just as there is no right in a
chemical plant for water not to boil at 212'F., there would be
no right to resist progressive social change based on the laws of
social science.
The American progressive movement, one of the first political
expressions of this awe of science and rational central planning,
saw individual rights and the Constitution as a barrier to need-
ed progressive and scientific social reform. The intellectual
climate, at best, looked at property as a poor relation that
should not be allowed out of the kitchen to socialize with politi-
cal, scientific, and artistic liberty in the front parlor. The courts
and treatises became ever more sympathetic, with some excep-
tions, to the needs of the sovereign for more central power to
solve real or perceived social and economic problems. This, of
course, generally came at the expense of property rights.
As an optimist, I see this intellectual trend as having run its
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course. It has burned out in the chaos of inner cities, racked by
drugs, illegitimacy, and crime. It has crumbled with the Berlin
Wall and the total economic and environmental disasters made
visible by the collapse of socialism. It has shattered in the
bombed-out buildings of a former country called Yugoslavia. At
home, pollution, cancer, AIDS, nuclear waste, and product lia-
bility have all shaken to its very core our faith in the ability of
science to solve human problems, and perhaps even its ability
to make the world better. On the optimistic side, our faith in
central power has dissipated in the flood of chaotic freedom
wrought by a million Internet sites and a thousand new ways
of making a living. People who are no longer tied to the factory,
the neighborhood store or bank, or even required to live in a
single place, tend to be rather libertarian by habit, if for no
other reason.
While the anti-property rights intellectual bias has begun to
disappear, it has left its mark upon our law and courts, and
their basic underlying assumptions. Thus, an understanding of
the role of property rights in a free society is timely.
A People of the Law
Understanding property rights is perhaps particularly timely
in a society like ours, built upon a foundation of a written
Constitution. In this sense America is a unique nation. Our
people come from every land on Earth. Even the ancestors of
Native Americans migrated here thousands of years ago across
the Bering land bridge. We are a people of every racial group,
every known religion, and virtually every language. What
unites us as a nation is our Constitution. It is our nationality
just as much as the time-immemorial connection with the land
of France makes a French person French.
Anyone who subscribes by oath to uphold and defend the
United States Constitution may become an American. It is our
civil religion and our repository of public values. To the extent
property rights lie at the heart of the document, they are at the
heart of our nationhood and nationality. To the extent we lose
our constitutional values, we risk the fate of a Bosnia, maybe
not today, but too soon, even if it is a hundred years off.
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The Dawn
Why are property rights essential to the existence of a free
society? Here my theory is relatively simple. They are the only
serious barrier to governmental tyranny while at the same time
the only real mechanism for civilized human interaction and
creativity. Of course, since property is a right, not a thing, its
existence is dependent upon the jealous enforcement of property
rights held by individuals against the government.
Let me illustrate the first part of the statement. Arbitrary or
tyrannical governmental power is limited, according to the civ-
ics textbooks, by the power to vote, the freedom of speech, and
by the courts' power to enforce these and other fundamental
rights. As a mechanical .description, this illustration is highly
simplistic, but not fundamentally mistaken. It does not, howev-
er, fully describe the working dynamic of a free society.
Without extensive property rights, jealously defended, only
the government would have the resources needed to organize
political campaigns or parties of any size. Without property
rights, no individual would have a base to run for office other
than those who hold governmental power. Without property and
contract rights, litigation in the courts would be a very limited
and ineffective tool for protecting anything. The judiciaries of
every former socialist country are a stark testimony to the
weakness and ineffectiveness of a dependent judiciary. Without
the right to advertise profit-making products, the free press and
media necessary for effective free speech, would be a mere
illusion.
Underlying all of our political and intellectual freedoms
which make for a civilized society is a foundation of widely
dispersed private property, and all the attributes of that system
that Madison so clearly understood: freedom to contract, free
markets, and personal security. Without this foundation, politi-
cal liberty and the ability to exercise those rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment would be a mere sham.
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Modes of Human Interaction: Command
Let me now focus on a more neglected portion of my first
point. Property rights not only serve the "negative" role of de-
fending the individual against the state, but also serve a vital
"positive" role, necessary to any free society. Human interaction
only occurs in a few ways. The first is when one person com-
mands another. This occurs in socialist command economies, in
slavery, in the military, and in legal relationships. Much of the
Anglo-American legal tradition has been concerned with civiliz-
ing, ameliorating, and making tolerable the limited areas where
command is necessary for human interaction even in the most
free of human societies.
Our criminal law, the area of administrative due process, and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice are all areas where we
have modified command decisions to limit their potential for
tyranny and human suffering. Until we become angels, we will
need these areas of the law. It is. a mark of the progress of
civilization that we have managed to abolish some areas of
command decisions like slavery and forced religious worship.
Tradition
The second major mode of human interaction is tradition or
custom. People assume relationships with each other because
the culture tells them this is the way it should be. Relation-
ships with churches and synagogues, family members, neigh-
bors, colleagues at the bar (both kinds), and many others, all
have significant components of this mode of interaction. Unfor-
tunately, tradition and custom, as effective rules governing
behavior, are fast fading into our past as television and the
Internet replace the town square and extended family as our
primary sources of information and socialization.
In the highly mobile America of the twentieth century (and
for that matter the world), fewer and fewer people live in com-
munities where a compact culture, sufficient to direct human
interaction in any complex way, exists. Even in the most isolat-
ed American town, satellite dishes can be seen dotting the
landscape. There is hardly a spot on earth where CNN does not
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keep people informed hourly, rather than weekly or monthly. In
1988, traveling in very rural Pakistan in the Himalayas, I
found local people following the American presidential election
with information that was not two days old (and more current
than what I had when I left the United States a week before)!
Cooperation: Property Rights
The only alternative to command or tradition as a basis for
human interaction is rational cooperation for mutual benefit.
Property rights are the only mechanism by which this coopera-
tion can be carried out over any length of time and beyond a
handful of individuals. Friends may plan a fishing trip, but no
fishing fleet was ever organized except by command, custom, or
the exercise of property rights. The accumulation of capital, the
development of trade beyond local barter, and the specialization
of labor upon which the modern world depends, all find their
mechanism in property rights.
Even the most voluntary of efforts, charities, clubs, and reli-
gious institutions are organized by the mechanism of property
rights. Property rights also provide the tool whereby such hu-
man interaction can be evaluated by the individuals involved.
They allow the proper allocation of resources including, most
importantly time, to be distributed in the mix most appropriate
at any time to fulfill the goals of those cooperating.
Without a firm system guaranteeing property rights, humans
are left with only command or tradition as arbitrary and very
inefficient organizing principles. Without property rights they
are also left with no free society.
II. LIBERTY = PROPERTY
The second aspect of my thesis, that there is no distinction
between liberty and property, is best illustrated by the legal
cases dealing with the freedom to advertise, so called "commer-
cial speech." These cases have made it abundantly clear that no
principled line can be drawn between speech directed to making
money, and speech directed to espousing a political position.
Any rationale that will allow you to suppress one will allow you
to suppress the other. First Amendment theory has reluctantly
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been drawn to this logic. The reluctance has been in large part
due to the hostility modem legal theory has borne towards
property rights and profit-making. Somehow it was not as ac-
ceptable to advertise a soap as to promote a candidate, even if
the candidate was "dirty" and the soap was clean. Chief Justice
Rehnquist captured the essence of this attitude when he noted
in Dolan v. City of Tigard3 that there is "no reason" why one
right protected under the Bill of Rights "should be relegated to
the status of a poor relation" of other, more frequently cited
rights also protected by those constitutional provisions.4
Commercial Speech: Case Study
In the first cases to recognize this fact, Bigelow v. Virginia5
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court was forced to confront
the fact that human motives cannot be separated by any objec-
tive test. The desire to make a buck and the desire to write a
poem appear very similar. Time, place, and manner are of little
use in distinguishing such disparate desires. A political com-
mercial is hardly different in length, mass, chemical composi-
tion, or albedo than one for Pepsi or Marlboro. Even the indi-
viduals who want to build houses are no different in demo-
graphics than those who want to write short stories. Thus, the
hallmark of First Amendment theory, that objective tests like
time, place, and manner are constitutionally permissible re-
strictions, while subjective tests of content are impermissible,
seems to require eliminating the distinction between commercial
speech and all other kinds of speech.
If a categorical distinction cannot be maintained in such a
relatively clear conceptual area as free speech theory, the prob-
lems with exercising other liberties, where the mechanics and
motivations are often far more complex, become mind boggling.
This complexity sometimes causes theorists to ignore such ar-
eas. The lesson I draw, however, is that perhaps our whole
categorical scheme is inadequate. Civil liberty and property
3. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
4. Id. at 392.
5. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
6. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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rights are not two types of "things," they are the same "thing."
House building and poem writing are no more different than
poem writing and sculpture. They are all exercises of one's
fundamental rights.
III. ECONOMIC LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL STEPCHILD
This brings me to the third and final aspect of my thesis.
Since the Great Depression, our legal system has become insen-
sitive to those rights associated with property or economic liber-
ty. I have already suggested some of the intellectual currents
that prompted this insensitivity. The definitive intellectual his-
tory of the anti-property-rights bias has yet to be written,
though there are some good works on the subject. It would be
impossible for this article to include such a history in the time,
space, or purpose allowed, and the cultural reasons here are
not as important for this article as the existence of the bias in
our current constitutional law.
The Intellectual Vision
Before examining several of the manifestations of the anti-
property rights bias, I should note that the movement away
from economic liberty and towards centralized governmental
power cannot be understood in primarily political terms. It is
not, nor has it been, a political phenomenon though it may
affect political debate. Too often this movement is portrayed in
contemporary society as a political phenomenon. This may be
because we have lost an understanding of how to think about
society in terms other than those of political rhetoric. To be
truly understood, the issue must be seen as a conflict of values,
conceptions, and views of the world. The political implications
of the bias may ultimately be important, but the political impli-
cations are a very secondary phenomenon-an effect, not a
cause.
Today, two world views about the structure of society contend
for our adherence. One view sees society in danger of disinte-
gration without some strong central governmental authority to
hold it together. The other sees individuals as fully capable of
organizing most of life, with collective authority at most playing
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a traffic-officer-type role. Property rights are profoundly individ-
ualistic. They thus have been seen somewhat negatively by
those who hold the first world view, and positively by those
who hold the second. The first view has been dominant in
America for much of this century, while the second view now
seems to be gaining an ascendancy.
Almost from the country's origins, the federal legal system
was confronted with the task of resolving disputes between
individuals claiming that the government had deprived them of
rights. The government or its beneficiaries usually defended
against these claims by arguing that such action was justified
by the needs of the government or society. The dilemma of the
legal system was always how to resolve these disputes in a
principled way from a general constitutional provision. The
need to resolve such disputes in a "principled way" occurs be-
cause the very essence of the common law tradition, as well as
the meaning of the concept "law" within that tradition, is a
principled, nonarbitrary, rationally predictable resolution of
disputes by independent and noninterested persons. In fact, no
legal system can long exist without this raison d'etre. But, how
do you do it when the facts of the disputes keep changing?
Five Judicial Eras and Four Models
Looking at the Supreme Court, we can identify five distinct
eras during our history.! The first, growing out of the Marshall
Court, and generally dominant between 1801 and 1836, was the
vested rights era. This can best be symbolized by Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward.8 This era and its approach
found that where the non-government claimant had vested
rights, claims based upon a common expectancy of non-interven-
tion by the government, the government could not undertake
the action, no matter how worthy. The concept of vested rights
drew heavily upon common law concepts of contract and proper-
ty. A strong element of its theory was that governmental policy
should not act retroactively.
7. These are very rough categories, I admit, and their definitive analysis needs
considerably more research.
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
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The second approach, which coincided with the tenure of
Chief Justice Taney, and the rise of Jacksonian democracy and
nationalist expansion into the West, tended to defer the con-
flicts to the legislative branch, which largely meant deferral to
state legislatures. The doctrine of popular sovereignty reached
its most dominant point during this period. This era put an
abiding faith in the political process to protect individual rights
from government power. Neighboring states, with empty land,
served as a backup constraint upon state power when pure
democratic choice threatened minorities, as it did in the case of
religious minorities at that time. With respect to federal power,
state sovereignty and popular democracy provided all the limits
needed. The case that perhaps best symbolizes this second
approach is Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.'
The Civil War, and in its aftermath the repudiation of state
sovereignty reflected by Reconstruction, led to a new concern
with protecting liberty against state as well as national power.
This ushered in the third era in my categorical scheme. Its
approach relied on the federal courts using the new Fourteenth
Amendment."0  These concerns, along with the industrial
revolution's need for economic liberty, became engines driving
the law to defend and expand economic liberty in various sec-
tors against state and national power. For the most part, the
national government as a whole supported the goal of greater
protection of economic liberty; therefore, little restraint was
needed for national policies infringing upon this liberty. This
era continued, with some reversals during the rise and fall of
progressivism, until the Great Depression. The case that be-
came its symbol is the much maligned Lochner v. New York."
The fourth categorical era began in the throes of an apparent
economic collapse, combined with the rise 'of collectivist ideolo-
gies in Europe, as well as at home. The courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, no longer sought a conceptual framework to
resolve disputes over claimed economic liberty violations; this
was not part of the judicial role. The courts abandoned all con-
ceptual tools that might bring them into conflict with national
9. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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economic policy as set by the President and Congress. Property
became a very narrow concept where judicial scrutiny was, at
most, confined to takings under the Fifth Amendment,' under-
stood as the narrowest definition of property rights. Perhaps
Wickard v. Filburn13 symbolizes the era best. Economic liberty
meant whatever the government said it meant.
The Final Chapter?
We have entered a fifth era. This era began haltingly in the
mid-1970s with the commercial speech and takings cases. As
yet, it lacks a coherent or comprehensive approach to resolving
disputes between citizen and sovereign over the limits of gov-
ernmental power. I believe, however, some things can be said
about the current era's trends.
First, the Law and Economics movement in the law schools,
beginning at the University of Chicago, has had the effect of
sensitizing the legal system to the reality of economic effects of
judicial actions, as well as the judicial and legal process itself.
During previous eras, courts often acted as if the world was as
simple as the hypothetical fact patterns that are often the basis
of judicial law-making in the summary judgment or appellate
context. In addition, the courts seemed to assume that the
judicial process was cost-free, instead of being one of many
factors to be considered in making economic decisions. Finally,
the courts acted as if the dynamic society we live in was frozen
while a decision was issued, with a slow period of thaw follow-
ing which the society contemplated how to change conduct to
comply with the new understanding of the law enunciated by
the decision. This almost mythological view has, in part, been
severely shaken by the Law and Economics movement's in-
sights. It is hard to ignore economic liberty as an issue when
the dynamism of the economy is understood. Economic analysis
has changed the law's conceptual framework.
The problems of mass communication, minority enterprise,
vast federal regulatory activity, and environmental quality also
have also forced the courts to consider, in ever more detail, the
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
13. 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
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connections between the free society and economic liberty. Not
since the early days of New Deal legislation has the problem
even seriously been back to the Supreme Court. Now, its foun-
dational questions again are being considered. Note the almost
cavalier treatment of the equal protection challenge to "econom-
ic" regulation in New Orleans v. Dukes, 4 even though there
was some evidence of racial discrimination in the regulation.
Thus, reading the tea leaves indicates that economic liberty
protections in the Constitution may be seen as judicially en-
forceable limitations on government that are not totally obso-
lete. This conclusion is bolstered by the decision in United
States v. Lopez 5 which suggested for the first time in many
years some limits on the federal government's power under the
Commerce Clause.
Another trend has been to take the mechanisms of economic
liberty more seriously. While this has been most pronounced in
the Supreme Court's attention to takings claims and advertising
restrictions, it can also be found in the areas of contract rights,
due process for business organizations, and the protection of
intellectual property. In all these areas, however, no deep trend
has developed. There is certainly no paradigm for treating eco-
nomic liberty as an equal partner with other types of liberty.
Nor is there any coherent framework for protecting economic
liberty as such. We are not seeing a restoration of substantive
due process or vested rights, nor are we likely to.
There is a high likelihood, however, that we will see a more
even distribution in the courts' scrutiny over alleged constitu-
tional violations. No longer will claimed violations of the Con-
tract, Export, Commerce, or Spending Clauses be losers from
the moment they are filed, no matter what the facts show.
Those provisions of the Constitution designed to protect eco-
nomic liberty again appear to have some use to the legal and
judicial system. If a truly new categorical era is emerging, it
will be identifiable by the development of some conceptual
framework by which to balance the inevitable conflicts between
alleged individual rights and claimed constitutional sources of
government power. Property rights, federalism, or economic
14. 421 U.S. 961 (1975).
15. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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liberty may provide such a framework. More likely, it is a con-
cept yet to be articulated.
A word of caution should be noted. The framers of the Con-
stitution never intended the judiciary to be the primary guard-
ians of liberty, economic or otherwise. They placed their hopes
in the political branches emanating from a healthy and vibrant
free society. The constitutional separation of powers, the system
of checks and balances, and most importantly federalism, were
their brilliant inventions to keep our nation from the tyranny
that dominated most of the world for most of history. And, for
the most part, it has worked well.
The courts work at the margins. They can restrain dominant
factions for relatively short periods, but they cannot ultimately
resist a majority faction that cares little for liberty or property
rights. We have been blessed by a providential God, who, for
most of our history, has given us a world where the mecha-
nisms created by the Framers did their job. At present we do
not need a judicial revolution for property rights. We need,
rather, some fine tuning and new conceptual tools whereby the
legal system can understand anew the intimate connections
between life, liberty, and property, and the fundamental integri-
ty of the human person.
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